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Nuclear power plants have logical loop structures in their system configuration.
This paper explains the method to solve a loop structure in reliability analysis. As ex-
amples of loop structured systems, the reactor core isolation cooling system and high-
pressure core injection system of a boiling water reactor are considered and analyzed
under a station blackout accident condition.
The analysis results show the important role of loop structures under severe accidents.
For the evaluation of the safety of nuclear power plants, it is necessary to accurately
evaluate a loop structure's reliability.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Some complex engineering systems have loop structures in
their system configuration, and sometimes their operation
depends on functional loop relations. A typical example existsental Education, Utsunom
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 5 7e1 6 4158source system, that is, a nuclear plant generates electricity
and it is used for the operation of pumps that supply water to
the reactor core for the production of steam and electricity.
Without an external power supply, a nuclear power plant can
continue its operation with the internally generated electric
power.
The second example is a component cooling water system.
Without the cooling water, the main components cannot
continue their operation and the generation of electricity has
to be ceased. The cooling water is circulated by a pump driven
by electricity.
Also, the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and
the high-pressure core injection system (HPCI) of a boiling
water reactor (BWR) show loop structures. In an accident
condition, steam from the reactor core drives a turbine pump
and this pump supplies cooling water to the reactor core to
maintain the core at a controlled temperature.
The reliability of all these loop-structured systems
formerly had to be solved by approximation. The simplest
method was to just ignore the loop structure and replace it
with a series structure. However, there is always anxiety
about the analysis results, and many different analysis
methods have been proposed as shown in the next section.
The authors have solved this difficulty, and the present paper
is based on the new findings [1].
First, we explain the exact method [1] for solving a logical
loop structure in reliability analysis. Next, the special core
cooling systems (RCIC and emergency core-cooling system)
of a BWR plant are considered and essential parts of logical
loop structures are modeled as relatively simple forms. The
model has been analyzed by the generalized analysis
method of loop structures [2] under the accident condition
“station blackout”. The availability of these systems under
accident conditions is calculated numerically.
The analysis results show the important role of loop
structures for system availability or reliability, especially
under severe accidents. For the evaluation of the safety of
nuclear power plants, it is necessary to accurately evaluate a
loop structure's reliability. Also the reliability analysis of a
loop structure can be utilized in effectively designing highly
reliable systems.Fig. 1 e Basic loop structure.2. Method for solving logical loops in system
reliability analysis
2.1. Problems in the loop structure
For systems that have logical loop structures, the Boolean
relations have to be described with unknown variables. The
number of unknown variables equals the number of essential
logical loop structures existing in the system. If we try to solve
a Boolean equation with unknown variables, we encounter
infinite circulation of the unknown variables. Logical loops are
not generally solved in terms of the arithmetic operators of
Boolean algebra.
Many attempts [3e6] have been proposed. An exact
method [1] has been proposed for solving this problem in
reliability analysis, but it was effective only in a restricted
analysis condition, that is, in the condition that almost allthe components are started at the same time. A more
generalized method [2,7] has been presented that can treat
complex analysis conditions.2.2. Solution of Boolean equation with an unknown
element
Consider a simple system as shown in Fig. 1, which is a
generalized system configuration for a single loop structure.
The U means upstream part against the loop structure. The
D is placed downstream from the loop. Parts A and B are the
elements of the loop, and only A directly connects to D.
Now, consider the probability that a loop structure is
functioning. So, it is necessary to distinguish between sound
state and operating state for components. A component does
not enter its operating state without a start signal or support
from an upstream component, even if it is in a sound state.
The set of operating states of part A is represented by the
italic character A. Italic characters X and Y represent the sets
of events in which outputs of B and D exist, respectively, that
are equivalent to the operating states of parts B and D. Then,
the following Boolean relations are obtained:
Y ¼ ðUþ XÞAD; X ¼ ðUþ XÞAB: (1)
Substitute the relationX¼ (UþX)AB into the first equation,
Y ¼ ðUþ ðUþ XÞABÞAD
¼ ðUþ XABÞAD ¼ UADþ XABD: (2)
The unknown element X cannot be eliminated, and the last
relation does not change after repeating the substitution of X.
This is the situation in which infinite circulation of an un-
known element appears.
Consider the next Boolean equation with unknown
element x.
x ¼ fða1;/;anÞxþ gða1;/;anÞ: (3)
where ai is an independent Boolean variable (fixed elements of
a Boolean algebra). Equation G ¼ H is equivalent to the
following equation in Boolean algebra:
GHþ GH ¼ f: (4)
Then, Equation 3 becomes as follows:
xðf xþ gÞ þ xðf xþ gÞ ¼ f;
x$f x$gþ xðf xþ gÞ ¼ f;
x

f þ x

gþ xðf xþ gÞ ¼ f:
(5)
It is transformed to the next equation:
x f gþ x g ¼ f: (6)
The Boolean theorems [8] say that the Boolean equation
xAþ xB ¼ f has a solution if and only if AB ¼ F has a
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arbitrary Boolean element.
The relation AB ¼ F is equivalent to equation fgg ¼ f ,
which always holds. Therefore the solution of Equation 3
becomes:
x ¼ mfða1;/;anÞ þ gða1;/;anÞ: (7)
The unknown element x can be expressed by ai and m
without x, where m is an indefinite arbitrary element. Basi-
cally, a loop structure can be solved.2.3. Indefinite element m
The solution of a Boolean equation with an unknown variable
has indefiniteconstantmasshown inEquation7. It is the reason
that most people did not pay much attention to the fact that a
Boolean equation with an unknown variable can be solved by
algebraic operations [7]. The situation in which there exist
indefinite constants is similar to that of differential equations.
Indefinite constants (Ci) appearing in the solution of
differential equations are determined by boundary or initial
conditions in solving an actual engineering system.
For Boolean equations, it is necessary to determine terms,
including m, in order to obtain a solution, which correctly
represents the reliability or availability of an actual engi-
neering system.
In Section 3.4, it is shown that arbitrary Boolean elementm
must be unity or a universal set under the condition that
Boolean elements represent operating states. With m ¼ 1, the
solution of Equation 3 correctly represents the operating state
of an actual engineering system.
Therefore, the solution of Equation 1 becomes:
X ¼ UABþ AB; Y ¼ UADþABD: (8)
and the solution of Equation 3 becomes:
x ¼ fða1;/;anÞ þ gða1;/;anÞ; (9)
instead of Equation 7.3. Key points for analysis of loop structure
3.1. Types of components
Two typical examples, a water supply system and an electric
power supply system, are considered as systems with a loop
structure, and fundamental aspects of loop characteristics
and the role of components are discussed [7].
The discussion deduces that it is necessary to classify
components into three different types. The information about
component type is used in judging whether a loop system can
continue its operation under isolated conditions, or not. There
are three types of components: self-sustained (SS) type,
generative (G) type, and transmitter (T) type [7].
3.1.1. SS type component
A SS-type component is one that can start and continue its
operation without any support by other components. The SS-
type component does not require support. Examples of thiscomponent type are batteries, radioisotopic powered genera-
tors, accumulator tanks, water tanks placed at high position,
external electric power sources, and so on.
If a start signal or command is given to an SS-type
component, it begins and continues its operation without any
support (input) from outside.
3.1.2. G-type component
A G-type component is one that can produce a driving force
for loop operation. In other words, it supplies sufficient energy
for the loop operation. Examples of this type of component are
engines, electric motors, and pumps. For the production of its
output, a G-type component requires support by other
components.
If there is no support to a G-type component, it cannot start
its operation even if the G-type component is in a sound state.
An engine requires a fuel supply, an electric motor requires
electricity, and a pump requires both water and electricity.
These G-type components cannot start and cannot continue
operation without these supports (inputs).
3.1.3. T-type component
A T-type component is one that cannot produce a driving
force for a loop operation. In other words, it does not produce
sufficient energy for a loop operation.
Examples of this type of component are pipes, wires, an
electric transformer, and an energy converter. These compo-
nents just transfer input to output. Pipes and wires transmit
their input, i.e., water or electricity, without changing its
quality.
Electric transformers and energy converters modify inputs
and produce some different quality of outputs, but they do not
give driving force.
For the production of its output, a T-type component also
requires input from other components. If there is no input to a
T-type component, it cannot send its output even if the T-type
component is in sound state.
Parts appearing in Fig. 1 are classified as follows: U is a SS-
type, at least one of A or B is a G-type, and Part D can be G-type
or T-type.3.2. Concrete expression for component states
In this paper, irreversible change of a component's state is
assumed, and variation with time is considered.
A set representing the sound state of component A in
standby condition at time t is expressed by the notation SA (t).
Then, the probability of component A's soundness becomes as
follows, for the constant standby failure rate lAS:
PrðSAðt t0ÞÞ ¼ SA0$expð  lASðt t0ÞÞ; (10)
where SA0 is the probability that component A is in sound
state at time t0 (initial time).
The notation sA,t is used for a set representing the event, in
which the starting signal is given to component A at time t.
The notation DA,t is used for a set representing the event in
which component A successfully starts its operation by a
given starting signal. Then, Pr (DA,t) equals the demand
probability.
Table 1 e Timing of starting signals given to components
in Fig. 2.
Time A(sA,ti) B(sB,tj) C(sC,tk)
t0
t1
t2
t3
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able state of component A (sound state of component A)
which has already operated for time duration t. For a constant
failure rate, Pr(OA(t)) becomes:
PrðOAðt t1ÞÞ ¼ expð  lAOðt t1ÞÞ; (11)
where t1 is the time atwhich component A starts its operation.
In this paper, consider the case in which the start signal is
given only once. More general discussions are given in [2,7].
If component A is SS-type, a set representing the operating
state of component A at time t is shown by Equation [12]. It is
denoted by AO(t), where lower suffix O means operating state.
AOðtÞ ¼ SAðt1  t0Þ$sA;t1$DA;t1$OAðt t1Þ: (12)
If a component is G- or T-type, the set of its operating state
contains the operating states of upstream components.3.3. Takeover phenomenon
Fig. 2 shows a case in which G-type component C is supported
by two SS-type components A and B.
Starting signals to the components are given at time ti, tj,
and tk, respectively. Assume a time sequence for starting
signals as shown in Table 1.
At time t2, component C could start its operation by the
support of component A, but it is not yet supported by
component B. There is a support gap between B and C, that is,
component B is started after the start of C, and B does not
support the start of C. This situation is called a “support gap”
between B and C. However, B begins to support the operation
of component C after time t3. Then, the operating state of
component C at time t;t3<t becomes as follows:
COðtÞ ¼ AOðtÞ$CðtÞ þ BOðtÞ$AOðt3Þ$CðtÞ:; t3 < t: (13)
where C(t) is an abbreviated expression of SCðt2  t0Þ$sC;±2
$DC;±2$OCðt t2Þ, which means that component C is started at
time t2 and reaches operable state. However, C(t) expresses
intrinsic characteristics of component C itself, and does not
express the actual operating state of component C.
The second term in Equation [13] represents the
contribution from the support by B, and this situation is
called a “takeover” in this paper.
The factor AO(t3) is defined as a “takeover factor”, and this
factor is a fixed value not a variable. Even if there is a “support
gap” between B and C, the link BeC becomes a “connecting
chain” by the “takeover” condition. The “connecting chain”Fig. 2 e Supported by two components.means that operation of component C is supported by
component B placed in an immediately upstream position.
3.4. Operating state of loop structure
In Section 2, a basic loop structure is considered as shown in
Fig. 1. Now, the operating state of the components in this loop
structure can be obtained via a step-by-step method.
Assume each component is started in the order shown in
Table 2.
The operating state of component A at time t1 is:
AOðtÞ ¼ UOðtÞ$AðtÞ; t ¼ t1: (14)
Then, the operating state of component B at time t2
becomes:
BOðtÞ ¼ AOðtÞ$BðtÞ ¼ UOðtÞ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ; t ¼ t2: (15)
Now consider the link BeA. In this order, there is a “support
gap” between the components B and A. With consideration of
the “takeover phenomenon”, the operating state of compo-
nent A after time t2 becomes:
AOðtÞ ¼ UOðtÞ$AðtÞ þ BOðtÞ$UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ
¼ UOðtÞ$AðtÞ þ UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ; t2 < t: (16)
Then the operating state of B after time t2 becomes:
BOðtÞ ¼ AOðtÞ$BðtÞ
¼ UOðtÞ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ þ UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ; t2 < t: (17)
Now, calculate the product of AOðtÞ$BOðtÞ :
AOðtÞ$BOðtÞ ¼ fUOðtÞ$AðtÞ þ UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞg$fUOðtÞ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ
þUOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞg
¼ UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ:
(18)
The second term of Equation 17 corresponds to the second
term of Equation 8 for the expression of X. This shows that
arbitrary Boolean element m must be unity or a universal set.
The term UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞrepresents the operating state of
the loop structure, and the operation of the loop does not need
the support of U [UO(t2) is a fixed value]. As elements of theTable 2 e Timing of starting signals given to components
in Fig. 1.
Time U A B D
t0
t1
t2
t3
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UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ.
System output, that is the operating state of D, becomes:
DOðtÞ ¼ UOðtÞ$AðtÞ$DðtÞ þ UOðt2Þ$AðtÞ$BðtÞ$DðtÞ; t3 < t: (19)
The above results are obtained for the simple operational
sequence. For more complex cases, please see [2,7].Fig. 3 e Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) of
Fukushima Daiichi Units 2 and 3.4. Engineering systems with loop structure
In a nuclear reactor system, many kinds of safety systems are
prepared for the prevention of accidents. If the normal opera-
tional system fails its function, usually emergency core cooling
systemsareactivatedandheat is removedfromthereactor core.
For example, a high-pressure core spray system, low-
pressure coolant injection system, residual heat removal
system, and so on, are utilized for cooling the core by injecting
cooled water into the reactor core by electrical pumps.
If a severe accident happens and all AC power is lost
(“station blackout”), as seen in the Fukushima Daiichi acci-
dent, these electrical pumps are stopped, and the emergency
core cooling systems also cease their function.
Fukushima Daiichi Units 2 and 3 have special cooling sys-
tems, RCIC, and HPCI. These systems are driven by a steam
turbine and do not require electricity to run. The steam is
supplied from the reactor core itself, so these systems are a
kind of loop-structured system.
Fig. 3showsthe layoutof theRCICofFukushima-DaiichiUnits
2 and 3 [9]. This system is driven by a steam turbine (RCIC
turbine). It is a defensive system against a condition known as
station blackout. Containment ventilation is necessary to
prevent the excess increase of temperature and pressure inside
the containment vessel for the long-term operation of this
system, without outside cooling water (sea water).
The HPCI is also driven by turbine as shown in Fig. 4. The
system configuration is almost the same as the RCIC except
for one additional pump, the HPCI booster pump. Long-term
operation of the HPCI requires ventilation of the
containment vessel for the prevention of excess increase of
temperature and pressure.
At the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 on March 11,
2011, the RCICwas startedmanually after the earthquake, and
stopped at 19 minutes after the start. It then started again 38
minutes later. Finally the RCIC stopped about 20 hours after
the restart. The HPCI was started at 12:35 on March 12, 2011, 1
hour after the stop of the RCIC. The cooling by the HPCI
continued for 14 hours and then stopped.
From Figs. 3 and 4, we can see that the components MO15,
MO16, and condensate water storage tank are used by both
systems. They couldbe consideredas one systemwith a double
loop structure, but their operations are demanded sequentially.Fig. 4 e High-pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) of
FukushimaeDaiichi Units 1e3.5. Modeling and expression by Boolean
equations
The functional relations between the components of the RCIC
and HPCI systems are expressed as shown in Figs. 5 and 6,
respectively. The arrows that connect components expressthe supporting relations. Red arrows indicate the demand
signals to open valves M131 and M21; these valves are initially
in a closed state. The main components and reactor core are
indicated by red circles, and pumps are indicated by blue
circles.
It is assumed that there is no adverse effect on the start of
loop operation from outside of the loop structure, when the
M15
TB-R
X
M16
CWT
M18
A22
M21
M20
AND
RC
P
M131
MZ15
MZ14
Fig. 5 e Functional relations between components of
reactor core isolation cooling. X represents the state in
which cooling water is injected into the reactor core (blue
arrow). A18, A22, air-operated valve; BP, booster pump;
CWT, condensate water storage tank; M14eM21, M131,
MZ9-8, MZ13-14, motor operated valves; P, turbine driven
pump; RC, reactor core; TB-H, steam driven HPCI turbine;
TB-R, steam driven RCIC turbine.
M15
TB-H
X
M16
M14
MZ9
MZ8
CWT
M17
A18
M19
M20
AND
RC
P
BP
AND
Fig. 6 e Functional relations between components of high-
pressure coolant injection system. X represents the state in
which cooling water is injected into the reactor core (blue
arrow). A18, A22, air-operated valve; BP, booster pump;
CWT, condensate water storage tank; M14eM21, M131,
MZ9-8, MZ13-14, motor operated valves; P, turbine driven
pump; RC, reactor core; TB-H, steam driven HPCI turbine;
TB-R, steam driven RCIC turbine.
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HPCI are evaluated after the successful start of RCIC. That is,
initial support is perfect [U(t2)¼ 1 in Equation 16] and the valve
open signal is correctly given (sA,j ¼ 1). This assumption
simplifies the analysis procedure.
Output X in Fig.5 is expressed in the following Boolean
equation:
X ¼ fRC$M15$M16$M131$MZ15$MZ14g$TB
 R$fCWT$M18g$P$fM20$M21$A22g$X: (20)
Equation 20 can be easily solved by the rule of Equation 7,
as follows:
X ¼ mfRC$M15$M16$M131$MZ15$MZ14g$TB
 R$fCWT$M18g$P$fM20$M21$A22g: (21)
and m ¼ 1, according to the previous discussion.
Steam from the reactor core forms just after the reactor
operation stops, then the RCIC successively starts with the
opening of valves and starting of turbine and pump.
For the HPCI, the procedure is almost the same. OutputX in
Fig.6, representing the successful operation of the HPCI, is
expressed in the following Boolean equation:
X ¼ mfRC$M15$M16$M14$MZ9$MZ8g$TBH$fCWT$M17$TB
H$BPg$P$fM20$M19$A18g:
(22)6. Analysis conditions and results
The reliability of successive operation of the RCIC and HPCI
after the “station blackout” was evaluated. At 0 hours, just
after the station blackout, it is assumed that motor operated
valves M131 and M21 were demanded to be opened, and
operation of the turbine and pump were started. The opera-
tion of the RCIC continued for 20 hours, then the HPCI was
started and its operation also continued for 20 hours. The
above assumption indicates that a small amount of electricity
was available for the operation of motor operated valves.
Failure rates of components are assigned as shown in Table
3 based on the data shown in the standard for procedures of
Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment [10] and component
reliability data collected by International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) [11].
A GO-FLOWchart [12] is constructed as shown in Fig. 7. The
RCIC part and the HPCI part are both included in this chart,
because they have commonly used components. The RCIC
and HPCI could be considered as one system with a double
loop structure, and the reliability analysis becomes a phased
mission problem [13].
With the aid of phasedmission operators (Operators 24 and
41 in Fig. 7), the dependency between the two systems (RCIC
and HPCI) is correctly treated.
Table 3 e Failure rates of components.
Motor/air operated valve
Failure of open/close action 3.6  103/d
Failure during usage 2.0  107/h
Pump
Fails to start 2.7  102/d
Failure during operation 1.0  104/h
Turbine
Fails to start 2.7  102/d
Failure during operation 1.0  104/h
Condensate water storage tank
Failure during operation 2.8  108/h
Fig. 8 e Analysis result.
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cooled by RCIC and HPCI successively. So, this is a typical
phased mission problem. In Phase 1, the RCIC is activated,
and, in Phase 2, the HPCI is used. At 20 hours after the start
of the RCIC, the next phase begins and the failure probability
discontinuously increases, because of the failure of the start
of the HPCI turbine, pump, and failure of the motor operated
valves to open.
System failure probability is not so small, because rela-
tively large values are assigned to component failure data for
conservatively evaluating these two systems.
The system has the following characteristics. The steam
used for driving the turbine is supplied from the reactor core
and it always exists unless the reactor core cools down. The
cooling systems, RCIC and HPCI, are loop-structured systems
with relatively simple components and can continue their
operation without external support.
These two emergency cooling systems can be said to be
reliable systems in the case of an accident as severe as a
“station blackout”, which actually happened at Fukushima-
daiichi following a large tsunami.7. Discussion
The exact method for solving a logical loop structure has been
briefly explained. As examples of loop structured systems, the
RCIC and HPCI of a BWR plant were described.
The severe accident “station blackout”, which actually
occurred during the Fukushima Daiichi accident, has been
considered. In this case, there is no electricity, neitherFig. 7 e GO-FLOW chart for the reactor core isolatioexternal nor emergency diesel generator. Therefore, a self-
sustained loop structured system becomes very important.
The RCIC and HPCI can be operable under the condition sta-
tion blackout.
The RCIC and HPCI are successively utilized under severe
accident conditions.
The loop structures have been solved by Boolean equa-
tions, and a double loop structure (RCIC and HPCI) has been
modeled into one GO-FLOW chart. The analysis results indi-
cate that at 40 hours of continuous operation after the
occurrence of “station blackout”, the success probability of
core cooling is about 85%.
In the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the reactor cores of
Units 2 and 3 melted down at about 79 hours and 78 hours
after the tsunami, respectively. The RCIC operated for 67
hours in Unit 2, and in Unit 3 the total operating time of the
RCIC and HPCI was about 33 hours. In actual accident condi-
tions, there were many difficult conditions and these factors
would have affected the success probability for preventing the
core meltdown.
The analysis results show the important role of loop
structures for system availability or reliability, especially
under severe accidents. For the evaluation of the safety of
nuclear power plants, it is necessary to evaluate a loop
structure's reliability accurately.
The method presented here assures that reliability ob-
tained for a loop-structured system is correct and there is no
need to worry about the deviation from the true value. How-
ever, if the system configuration or the operational sequence
becomes complex, the analysis procedure is tedious and
needs much attention. There is no good software available for
the handling of Boolean algebra.n cooling and high-pressure coolant injection.
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simple, an approximate method as used in fault tree analysis
gives almost the same results, that is, the deviations are small
or negligible.
Also the reliability analysis of a loop structure can be uti-
lized in effectively designing highly reliable systems.Conflicts of interest
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